Career concerns and 'unpaid' executives by Chen, Hui et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Career concerns and ’unpaid’ executives
Chen, Hui; Luo, Wei; Soderstrom, Naomi
Abstract: A significant portion of CEOs in publicly-listed Chinese state-owned enterprises receive zero pay
from the companies for which they work. Instead, they are paid directly by their controlling shareholder,
which can be the Chinese government or parent firms that are controlled by the Chinese government. We
explore how these “unpaid” executives are motivated and whether the outcomes of this unusual incentive
mechanism differ from the conventional approach. Consistent with career concerns as their main incentive
mechanism, we find that these CEOs have a significantly higher probability of future promotion than
other CEOs. This result holds when we look at subsamples in which individual CEOs switch payment
regimes. We also find that compared to their peers with paid CEOs, firms with unpaid CEOs in general
have higher return on assets, higher asset turnover, higher asset growth, and engage in less tunneling.
To mitigate concerns of that our results are driven by CEO selection and to further investigate the use
of implicit incentives, we conduct an event study using the Split Share Structure Reform in 2006. The
Reform liberalized the Chinese stock market, thus strengthening the role of the market as an incentive
mechanism. This mechanism provides a potential replacement for promotion incentives. Our evidence is
generally consistent with a reduction in the strength of promotion incentives following the reform.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822622
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-173098
Journal Article
Published Version
Originally published at:
Chen, Hui; Luo, Wei; Soderstrom, Naomi (2016). Career concerns and ’unpaid’ executives. SSRN
Electronic Journal, (2822622):1-57.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822622
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2822622 
1 
 
 
Career Concerns and “Unpaid” Executives* 
 
 
 
Hui Chen 
University of Zurich 
 
Wei Luo 
Peking University 
 
Naomi Soderstrom 
University of Melbourne 
 
 
July 24, 2016 
 
 
 
Abstract: A significant portion of CEOs in publicly-listed Chinese state-owned enterprises 
receive zero pay from the companies for which they work. Instead, they are paid directly by their 
controlling shareholder, which can be the Chinese government or parent firms that are controlled 
by the Chinese government. We explore how these “unpaid” executives are motivated and 
whether the outcomes of this unusual incentive mechanism differ from the conventional 
approach. Consistent with career concerns as their main incentive mechanism, we find that these 
CEOs have a significantly higher probability of future promotion than other CEOs. This result 
holds when we look at subsamples in which individual CEOs switch payment regimes. We also 
find that compared to their peers with paid CEOs, firms with unpaid CEOs in general have 
higher return on assets, higher asset turnover, higher asset growth, and engage in less tunneling. 
To mitigate concerns of that our results are driven by CEO selection and to further investigate 
the use of implicit incentives, we conduct an event study using the Split Share Structure Reform 
in 2006. The Reform liberalized the Chinese stock market, thus strengthening the role of the 
market as an incentive mechanism. This mechanism provides a potential replacement for 
promotion incentives. Our evidence is generally consistent with a reduction in the strength of 
promotion incentives following the reform. 
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1. Introduction 
A surprisingly high portion of the executives of publicly-listed Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) do not receive any compensation from the firms for which they work. During 
our sample period 1999-2011, almost 40% of the highest ranked executives in publicly-listed 
Chinese SOEs received zero pay, i.e., the pay disclosed for these executive officers/directors in 
company filings with the Chinese stock exchange is zero.1 Rather than being paid by the 
publicly-listed companies that officially employ them, most of these “unpaid” executives are 
actually paid by their controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholders are either a government 
agency or a parent company that is affiliated with and controlled by the government. Compared 
to their peers that are directly paid by the publicly-listed companies, compensation of the unpaid 
executives can be significantly lower in level and contains very few performance-based 
incentives.2 This means that the SOEs likely use strategies other than typical explicit incentive 
schemes to motivate the CEOs to perform. 
This unusual pay arrangement has attracted a lot of criticism from the Chinese popular 
press, which often cites it as an example of the underdeveloped nature of the market system in 
China. For example, Business magazine warned against the “terrible” zero pay, claiming that 
resulting disincentives could lead to worse consequences than overly high pay (Ma, 2009). 
Securities Daily reported that 346 CEOs of publicly-listed firms received zero pay in year 2012, 
and therefore “may not care about firm performance” (Jiao, 2013). More recently, China 
Securities Journal pointed out the executives in almost 300 firms received zero compensation, 
while their peers in other firms enjoyed a significant raise (Dai, 2016). Despite the criticism, it is 
                                                          
1 What we refer as “unpaid” here in the paper differs from the case of undisclosed pay. When a firm chooses not to 
disclose the pay of an executive, the database reports the corresponding pay level as “undisclosed”. 
2 The compensation of Chinese government employees follows a strictly pre-defined system, largely determined by 
the functions and rank of the position held. Even though the bonus part of the government employee pay may vary 
with performance, its incentive effect is very weak compared to performance-based compensation in private sectors.   
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unclear whether such compensation practices actually result in any loss of efficiency, since no 
systematic study has examined the issue empirically.  
In this paper, we investigate how implicit incentives may motivate the unpaid executives 
and whether the outcomes of using this unusual incentive mechanism differ from a conventional 
explicit incentive approach. Specifically, we ask four related research questions: 1) Do unpaid 
executives have stronger implicit incentives through a higher probability of promotion? 2) Do 
these implicit incentives for unpaid CEOs result in better performance? 3) Are unpaid CEOs 
more likely to expropriate company resources for the controlling shareholders? and 4) Do 
improvements in market mechanisms such as the Split Share Structure Reform of 2006 change 
the extent and effectiveness of promotion incentives for unpaid CEOs? 
We first hypothesize that unpaid executives are incentivized through career concerns, an 
implicit incentive related to “concerns about the effect of current performance on future 
compensation” (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992, p. 468). Career concerns can be manifested through 
consideration of one’s reputation, hope for future promotion, avoidance of job termination, etc. 
In our paper, we define the Chinese executives’ career concerns as the probability of being 
promoted to a higher-level position. Fama (1980) suggests that competition in the labor market 
alone might be sufficient to give managers enough incentives without explicit agency contracts. 
Holmstrom (1982) models career concerns through a two-period game, and shows that the 
agent’s pay in the first period can be devoid of any performance-based incentive for him to be 
sufficiently motivated for the expected reward in the second period. In fact, many jobs such as 
politicians and other government officials are not incentivized by performance-based pay, but 
rather are disciplined and motivated by career concerns (Dewatripont et al. 1999).  
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Using a dataset of 8602 SOE firm-years between 1999 and 2011, we find that relative to 
paid CEOs, unpaid CEOs have a three times higher probability of receiving a promotion in the 
following year. To isolate the incentive differences between paid and unpaid CEOs, our models 
control for CEO political connections and other individual characteristics, as well as firm 
performance. Our results validate the conjecture that unpaid CEOs have a stronger implicit 
incentives related to future promotion. Further robustness tests rule out the possibility that the 
higher promotion probabilities we find for unpaid CEOs are driven by selection of superior 
quality CEOs for the unpaid contracts. 
We next examine performance outcomes related to use of career concerns as a 
managerial incentive. Theory predicts that career concerns can be as effective as conventional 
incentives such as performance-based pay. We investigate various measures of performance of 
SOE firms with unpaid executives and their paid peers, controlling for factors that may 
contribute to differences in firm performance. Contrary to the concerns raised by the Chinese 
popular press, we do not find any evidence that the performance outcome of firms with unpaid 
CEOs is inferior to their peers with paid CEOs. In fact, we find that firms with unpaid executives 
tend to have higher return on assets, higher asset turnover, and higher asset growth.3 This result 
indicates that career concerns can be an effective incentive mechanism.  
We also explore a potential downside of having an unpaid CEO for minority shareholders. 
Prior research shows that Chinese SOEs are involved in “tunneling” activities, which implies the 
transfer of resources from publicly-listed subsidiaries to the government-owned parent firm. 
Since unpaid executives are paid by the government or government-controlled parent firm, they 
                                                          
3 We also examine the performance outcomes measured as stock returns, and growth in number of employees, but 
do not find any statistically significant differences between the two groups.  Sales growth is marginally greater for 
the firms with unpaid CEOs. 
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may have an incentive to facilitate tunneling and help siphon funds from the publicly-listed firms 
to the controlling shareholder. However, we fail to find evidence that the firms with unpaid 
executives engage in more tunneling, as measured by net transfer to the parent firm and other 
accounting receivables. On the contrary, for the entire sample period, firms with unpaid CEOs 
exhibit less tunneling via transfers than firms with paid CEOs.   
To more closely link our results to the composition of incentives, we conduct an event 
study using the Split Share Structure Reform in 2005 (hereafter, “Reform”). The Reform allows 
shares that were initially non-tradable (typically owned by the government) to become freely 
traded in the stock market. The Reform significantly mitigates conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. It further privatizes and liberalizes the Chinese stock 
market, and has affected the Chinese financial market in many ways, such as improving market 
liquidity, operating efficiency and corporate governance (Li et al. 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Liao 
et al. 2014; Ke et al. 2015). The Reform strengthens the effects of external governance 
mechanisms such as takeovers and monitoring by other groups of shareholders, and thus reduces 
the need for internally generated incentive systems. We expect the implicit incentive effect on 
the unpaid executives to become weaker and their incentives become more similar to those of 
paid executives. The results of the analyses are generally consistent with our prediction. We find 
that the Reform reduced the probability of future promotion for unpaid CEOs. We find a decline 
in performance differences between firms with unpaid versus unpaid CEOs. We do not find any 
evidence supporting increased tunneling activities after the Reform. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, this paper provides a 
unique natural experiment to empirically examine the effectiveness of career concerns relative to 
explicit incentives through performance-based pay. Career concerns have been difficult to 
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examine with data from typical executive labor markets such as in North America, since it is 
essentially an unobservable variable at individual level. Empirical studies have provided support 
for the effectiveness of career concerns in various settings, such as mutual fund managers 
avoiding termination (Chevalier and Ellison 1999), CEOs near retirement seeking for board 
positions (Brickley et al, 1999), mid-level managers seeking promotions (Ederhof, 2011), and 
sports coaches who face intense labor market competition (Cadman and Gasser, 2014). However, 
prior research could only use inexact measures such as the executives’ age and tenure to proxy 
for career concerns. In contrast, Chinese SOEs offer a unique setting where the paid and unpaid 
executives face different incentive methods and where we can control for individual 
characteristics.  
Second, study of this unique aspect of the Chinese SOE compensation setting is also 
important. CEOs of almost 40% of the firms in our sample that have unpaid CEOs are generally 
omitted from research on Chinese compensation because their pay is not reported (e.g., Conyon 
and He 2011). This results in an incomplete picture in the literature of compensation practices 
and their impact on Chinese companies. Further, prior research has shown that the pay-
performance sensitivity in Chinese firms is significantly lower than that of comparable American 
firms (i.e., Conyon and He 2011; Bryson et al. 2014). The managerial incentive through 
performance-based pay seems to be especially low in publicly-listed Chinese SOEs. We find 
evidence that career concerns can provide as strong (if not stronger) incentives as conventional 
performance-based pay. This incentive scheme does not appear to lead to anti-productive 
behaviors such as tunneling. Our findings thus provide some insights why Chinese SOEs 
perform well despite their seemingly inadequate use of typical managerial incentives. 
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Third, given the prevalence of business groups in emerging markets and some developed 
countries, our findings have implications for design of implicit incentives across the levels of 
organization for these business groups. Prior literature suggests the mixed findings on tunneling 
in business groups (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; Bertrand et al. 2002; Siegel and Choudhury 2012; 
Buchuk et al. 2014). Our results of less tunneling by unpaid executives indicate that implicit 
incentives provided by business group may be a factor that explains the mixed findings. 
Fourth, our study shows unexpected consequences of the Split-Share Structure Reform on 
implicit incentives of SOEs. Prior literature emphasizes efficiency gains from increased 
marketization of stemming from the Reform (i.e., Li et al. 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Liao et al. 
2014). Our results indicate that the Reform has a negative impact on strength of career concern 
incentives of SOE executives and that subsequent to the Reform, firm performance differences 
between companies with paid and unpaid CEOs narrow. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1. Implicit Incentives via Career concerns 
An economic agent can be motivated through various incentive schemes. An explicit 
incentive system typically includes a formal contract that specifies a pre-determined relation 
between the manager’s performance and pay. Implicit incentives, such as career concerns, do not 
involve formal contracts. Instead, the agent exerts effort today in the hope for a reward tomorrow. 
This future reward could be a new job opportunity, a promotion, avoiding termination, or simply 
gaining a good reputation in the labor market. For example, a politician or a junior faculty 
member may work diligently in the hope of being reelected or being tenured, despite the lack of 
performance-based pay in their compensation.  
8 
 
Holmstrom (1982) models career concerns through a two-period game, in which the 
agent’s pay in the second period depends on his performance in the first period. The agent must 
determine how much effort to exert in the first period to maximize his total utility across both 
periods. The principal tries to infer the agent’s true ability from his first-period performance, and 
uses that information to determine his second-period pay. In equilibrium, the agent exerts 
positive effort even when his wages in both periods are fixed (zero pay-for-performance 
sensitivity). Note that the incentive provided by career concerns is not without flaws: the agent 
typically over-exerts effort earlier in their career and under-exerts later. 
 Empirical research on career concerns often uses age or job horizon as a proxy for 
strength of the incentive. For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find that the general 
sensitivity of the executive’s pay is significantly stronger for those who will retire soon than for 
those who still have many years to go before retirement. This is because younger executives have 
strong career concerns and can be motivated without performance-based pay. On the contrary, 
compensation for older executives must be explicitly linked to their performance for them to be 
motivated. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the behavior of mutual fund managers and their 
incentive to avoid termination. They find that the young fund managers demonstrate herding 
behavior to avoid unsystematic risk and stay in their jobs. Yim (2013) finds that younger CEOs 
are more aggressive in mergers and acquisitions, since acquisitions tend to significantly increase 
a CEO’s future compensation. 
 Of course career concerns are not limited to young managers. For example, CEOs near 
retirement, who seek post-retirement board positions, demonstrate significantly better 
performance (Brickley et al, 1999). Ederhof (2011) finds evidence that mid-level managers, who 
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have weaker chance to be promoted to the top level, receive stronger bonus-based incentives. 
Gayle et al. (2015), however, suggests that career concerns are most effective at the middle ranks. 
China offers a unique experimental setting in which to examine incentive issues related to 
career concerns. Due to its political ideology and rapidly expanding economy, the incentive 
mechanisms used in China and other parts of Asia often differ from in western economies. For 
example, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006a) find that Chinese SOEs with a government agency as the 
largest shareholder do not seem to use performance-related pay for their executives. That is, 
there seems to be no link between the CEOs’ pay and firm performance.4 On the other hand, 
CEO pay in firms controlled by private block holders appears to increase in stockholders’ wealth 
and/or firm profits, although the pay-performance sensitivity is still quite low (Conyon and He 
2011). 
With this relative weakness of explicit incentives, it is likely that implicit incentives such 
as career concerns play a large role in incentivizing Chinese CEOs. Although use of explicit 
incentives is weak, there is variation in pay-performance sensitivity, which leads to variation in 
expected use of implicit incentives. Finally, because we can track the career path of the 
executives, we can see performance outcomes related to the use of implicit incentives. Together, 
these factors make the Chinese market an interesting setting in which to study the use and 
effectiveness of implicit incentives. 
2.2. Institutional Setting 
As China has transitioned from a centrally planned economy toward a market economy, 
Chinese SOEs have become increasingly market-oriented. Since the establishment of two stock 
                                                          
4 Relatedly, Kato and Long (2006) find a weak link between turnover and performance for listed firms controlled by 
the state, although they do not explore whether the turnover was due to a promotion or demotion. 
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exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) in early 1990s, the Chinese government has corporatized 
and partially privatized many SOEs through initial public offerings.  
In addition to increased privatization, governance of SOEs has evolved over time. Prior 
to 2003, various governmental agencies acted as representatives of the state to supervise SOEs. 
On May 27 2003, The State Council issued “Provisional Regulations on the Supervision and 
Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises” and established the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). SASAC is 
responsible for regulation and supervision of Central SOEs. Subsequently, each level of local 
governments also sets up state-owned assets supervision and administration authorities. SASAC 
at the national level guides and supervises work of the local SASACs. The purpose of SASAC 
system is to promote efficient management of SOEs like any other private companies and shield 
them from the government’s social and public management functions.  
Although the Chinese government seeks to enhance SOE efficiency, SOEs are subject to 
government interference due to social and political concerns (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
government owner can compel the firms to enter government-favored industries, pay additional 
taxes, increase local employment regardless of need, or provide social services to alleviate fiscal 
and employment problems (Bai and Xu, 2005; Bai et al. 2006). SOEs also are subject to 
governmentally-driven objectives (Lin and Li 2008). For example, the mission set out for the 
Chinese SOEs under the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) was to “grow bigger and stronger”, and 
under the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015), to “upgrade economic structure and pursue 
excellence”. These objectives are not necessarily in alignment with market incentives. 
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Chinese government can hold SOE shares directly through a state asset management 
agency (after 2003, normally SASAC). As Fan et al. (2013) illustrates, the government can also 
choose to indirectly control the SOE through a pyramid structure. In this structure, the 
intermediate layers are usually other SOEs or state asset management companies. A listed SOE 
is thus part of a large SOE group with multiple layers of companies. Unlike the listed SOE, the 
parent SOE group faces less public scrutiny and monitoring by market participants. In our 
sample, the CEOs are employed by listed SOEs. Paid CEOs are paid by the listed SOE for whom 
they work. Unpaid CEOs are paid by an SOE that is higher up in the pyramid. 
Representing the government, SASACs at both national level and local levels appoint, 
evaluate, compensate, dismiss, and promote SOE executives. Their decisions often reflect 
political priorities of the controlling government. The majority of SOE executives come either 
from the bureaucratic system or from internal SOE promotions. Although SASACs put effort 
into global recruiting of SOE executives, this has proven difficult. Therefore, most SOE 
managers have bureaucratic titles, especially those in unlisted SOE groups. 
Although the Chinese government implemented an “annual salary system” for SOE 
executives as early as 1992, the majority of executive salaries still depend on firm location, 
industry, firm size, and the executive’s bureaucratic rank, job type and personal qualifications. 
SASACs try to promote incentive pay that links firm performance such as profit, profitability 
and Economic Value Added© to salaries. Increasing the use of performance-based pay has 
largely been unsuccessful, however. Due to social concerns, the government has imposed 
regulations capping executive compensation at some multiple of the average pay of employee.5 
                                                          
5 From 2015, SOEs controlled by the central government face further requirements to limit the level of executive 
pay. 
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Moreover, SASACs are conservative with respect to providing high powered incentives such as 
equity compensation. Even in the rare cases when executives do get some equity incentives, it is 
still difficult for them to pocket the gains from increased stock value. These granted stocks are 
thus more window dressing than genuine compensation (Chen et al. 2013). 
In addition to compensation, the Chinese government provides career incentives to SOE 
executives. Many SOE executives obtain government positions after serving for years in SOEs. 
A notable case is the promotion of Gang Xiao, the former chairman of Bank of China (a central 
SOE), who became the chairperson of China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2013 (the 
regulator of Chinese stock market). SOE executives can also be transferred to another SOE as a 
promotion. For instance, on May 27, 2016, Zou Lei, the chairman of Harbin Electric Corp, 
became the chairman of Dongfang Electric Corp; and Zefu Si, the general manager of Dongfang 
Electric Corp, became the chairman of Harbin Electric Corp. Appendix A provides an example 
of the structure of a typical local-level SOE. 
2.3. Research on Compensation Incentives in Chinese SOEs 
 Some prior literature has examined optimal managerial incentives in the Chinese SOE 
setting, although the findings are inconsistent. Mengistae and Xu (2004) show that the pay of 
unlisted SOE executives is linked with firm performance. Groves et al. (1995) find that 
management turnover in unlisted SOEs is negatively related to firm performance. Firth et al. 
(2006b) find that listed SOEs exhibit turnover-performance sensitivity. Cao et al. (2011) find a 
strong relation between executive pay and accounting performance measures for SOEs. However, 
some other studies show conflicting results. Firth et al. (2006a) find no evidence of pay-for-
performance sensitivity in firms controlled directly by government agencies, but a positive 
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sensitivity in firms controlled by the government through multiple layers. Ke et al. (2012) find 
no relation between executive turnover and firm performance in SOEs. 
 Related to our study, Cao et al. (2014) examine the substitution effect between implicit 
incentives (political motivation) and explicit incentives. Specifically, they find that monetary 
compensation-based incentives (based upon levels of compensation) are weaker when CEO 
incentives are heavily driven by political career concerns. However, the regression models in 
Cao et al. (2014) examine the relation between current year promotion and current year 
performance. Implicit incentives should be measured ex ante—it is the expectation of promotion 
that provides incentives. Further, because Cao et al. (2014) include monetary compensation in 
their analyses, they omit unpaid executives from their sample. 
Several studies have measured implicit incentives by examining political connections. Li 
et al. (2008) find that politically connected CEOs in privately owned enterprises have a positive 
effect on firm performance and enhance profitability. Fan et al. (2007) focus their research 
specifically on China’s newly partially privatized firms. Based on data from 1993 to 2001, they 
find that three-year post-IPO stock returns are lower for firms with politically connected CEOs 
than for firms with non-politically connected CEOs. In contrast, using data from 2001 to 2005, 
Hu and Leung (2009) find a significant increase in firm performance following the appointment 
of political executives in SOEs. Similar performance improvement does not appear to occur in 
firms that appoint managers without political background and experience. Overall, results in this 
literature do not find a consistent association between political connections and firm performance. 
It therefore remains an open question as to whether implicit incentives stemming from political 
connections positively or negatively affect CEO behavior.  
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Although often used in the literature, political connection is not necessarily a good proxy 
for career concerns as an incentive mechanism. While political connections may increase the 
number of available jobs, promotions are more likely to be based on performance while in the 
job. Further, promotions for SOE CEOs are likely to be business rather than political promotions 
(in our sample, they are twice as likely) and are therefore less likely to be driven by political 
connections. Our setting provides a much cleaner proxy for career concerns by using the 
probability of future promotion. Our models also control for the CEO’s work history in the 
government, which has a more indirect relation with these incentives.  
Because they receive no pay from their direct employers, unpaid CEOs in our study have 
typically been omitted from the extant literature. The clear difference between these CEOs and 
their paid peers provides an opportunity to investigate implicit incentives and their impact not 
only in the Chinese setting, but also insights into the more general phenomenon of the use of 
career concerns as an incentive.  
2.4. Hypothesis development 
Unlike paid CEOs, unpaid CEOs are less likely to have contracts that include 
performance-based pay. Although these executives may receive non-monetary perquisites, 
granting of these benefits does not appear to be performance-based. This means that the SOEs 
cannot rely on explicit contracts to provide incentives for the unpaid CEOs. We therefore argue 
that the primary performance incentive for these executives is the possibility of promotion (i.e., 
career concerns) (Holmstrom 1982). We hypothesize that SOEs with unpaid CEOs are more 
likely to use promotions as an implicit incentive related to career concerns as a means of 
motivating the CEOs to perform well. A higher likelihood of promotion increases the strength of 
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the incentive, so stronger incentives related to career concerns should manifest in a higher 
likelihood of future promotion for unpaid CEOs in comparison with paid CEOs. Our first 
hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, relative to paid CEOs, unpaid CEOs have higher 
probability of future promotion. 
 
Given the existence of an implicit incentive related to promotion for unpaid CEOs, a 
natural question that arises is the effectiveness of this incentive, especially in comparison with 
the CEOs’ paid peers. It is possible that this type of contract results in stronger incentives for 
managers to perform. Of course, in an ideal world, assuming incentive mechanisms are applied 
in an optimal way and holding everything else equal, there should be no difference in 
performance outcomes under the different incentive schemes. However, off equilibrium results 
can always occur due to various reasons. For example, the unpaid CEOs may have better 
connections with the government and thus may enjoy an unfair advantage. On the other hand, the 
parent SOE may put the CEOs in place to extract resources from the company for the controlling 
shareholder, which would result in lower levels of financial performance and potentially, lower 
efficiency. It is thus an empirical question whether the promotion incentives related to career 
concerns result in the company achieving superior performance relative to more traditional 
compensation contracts, which place a higher weight on explicitly defined performance-based 
pay.  
H2a: Ceteris paribus, financial performance of companies with unpaid CEOs 
does not differ significantly from companies with paid executives.  
H2b: Ceteris paribus, operational efficiency in companies with unpaid CEOs 
does not differ from companies with paid executives.  
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While a private firm seeks to maximize its profit due to market incentives, an SOE often 
maximizes a weighted average of its own profit and the welfare of other parties in the economy, 
since its interests at least partially reflect the interests of the government. For example, whereas a 
private firm would not consider employment level to be of major importance, an SOE may 
consider employment as a high priority.  In addition, relative to a private firm (whose goal is to 
maximize profit), an SOE (whose goal is to maximize total social welfare) may tend to 
overproduce and oversell (Bova, 2015). SOEs may also place more emphasis on firm growth, 
because a larger organization is more likely to fulfill the societal needs of higher employment 
and higher supply of goods.  
Further, the parent companies for our sample firms are not necessarily publicly traded. 
These untraded parent firms are also SOEs, and are even more likely to have a broader objective 
than the publicly traded subsidiaries, which are subject to external monitoring. If the stronger 
implicit incentives given to unpaid CEOs provide effective incentives for achieving the parent 
SOE’s goals, unpaid CEOs should be more likely to focus on overall growth. We should 
therefore observe higher growth in firms with unpaid CEOs relative to firms with paid CEOs.6  
H2c: Ceteris paribus, growth in companies with unpaid CEOs is significantly 
higher than in companies with paid executives. 
 
It is possible that unpaid executives are appointed by the SOE parent to siphon subsidiary 
wealth to the parent. Prior research has shown that Chinese CEOs often engage in “tunneling,” 
which is a transfer of subsidiary resources to the parent firm. For example, Jiang, Lee, and Yue 
(2010) find that during 1996–2006, significant amount of funds was siphoned from hundreds of 
                                                          
6 Consistent with our earlier arguments, to the extent that the unpaid CEO focuses on growth, overall financial 
performance may be negatively affected. 
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Chinese firms to controlling shareholders in the form of “other receivables.” Most of these intra-
company loans did not accrue interest, and even when there was interest charged, neither interest 
nor principle was typically paid back. Jiang et al. (2010) find significant negative impacts on the 
affiliates’ financial performance related to such tunneling activities. Additionally, Cheung et al. 
(2010) show that different levels of the government matter in the tunneling activities from their 
SOEs. Specifically, SOEs controlled by the central government seem to benefit, rather than being 
taken advantage of, by their controlling shareholders.  
 In our setting, the association between tunneling and whether the CEO is officially paid 
by the company is not straight forward. If the unpaid CEO is placed in the company to extract 
resources for the parent firm, then there should be more tunneling if the CEO is unpaid. Further, 
Wang and Xiao (2011) examine the association between tunneling and executive compensation 
and incentives and find that stronger pay-performance sensitivity reduces the incentive to tunnel. 
Since unpaid CEOs have lower pay-performance sensitivity, they may therefore engage in more 
tunneling. On the other hand, the unpaid CEOs may have stronger incentives to run the business 
successfully than their paid peers. If the career concerns are strong enough, the unpaid CEOs 
would be less likely to engage in tunneling, which hurts the firms’ financial performance. 
H3: Ceteris paribus, tunneling behavior of companies with unpaid CEOs 
does not differ from tunneling behavior of companies with paid CEOs.  
 
Thus far, we have argued that unpaid CEOs’ behaviors are predominantly 
affected by promotion incentives, since other types of incentives such as explicit pay for 
performance and market incentives play a small role in their contracts. However, if the 
relative balance of incentives changes, we expect to see a change the strength of the 
promotion incentives.  
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The Split Share Structure Reform of 2005 significantly changed the structure of 
incentives within the Chinese financial market. Prior to the Reform, the Chinese A-share 
stock market had a “split share” structure, featuring two different types of shares: 
tradeable and non-tradable. The non-tradable shares (constituting about two thirds of the 
stocks in the A-share market) were stocks primarily owned by the Chinese government 
and affiliates. The split share structure was a legacy from the partial privatization of the 
Chinese economy, and caused problems such as market illiquidity, operating inefficiency 
and poor corporate governance (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005). 
The Reform allowed the formerly non-tradeable shared in the A-share market to 
gradually free float, with some SOE firms selected for pilot tests and other firms 
following shortly afterward. By the end of year 2007, almost all stocks in the Chinese A-
share market were successfully converted to tradeable shares. The Reform appears to 
have brought benefits for many different aspects of the Chinese economy, indicating an 
increase in the strength of market incentives. For example, researchers have shown 
empirical evidence consistent with better risk sharing (Li et al., 2011), improvements to 
SOE performance (Liao et al. 2014), improved corporate governance (Cumming et al., 
2011), and reduced cash holdings by SOE firms (Chen et al, 2012). 
We argue that the Reform affects incentives for SOE firm executives overall and will 
differentially impact paid versus unpaid CEOs. After the reform, market incentives become more 
effective because SOE block holders can now exit (Hope et al. 2015) and the corporate control 
market becomes an active tool for the government (Ke et al. 2015). This reduces the need for 
implicit incentives such as the possibility of promotion. The Reform thus allows the market to 
more strongly discipline CEOs through mechanisms such as takeovers and enhanced monitoring 
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by other groups of shareholders. We conjecture that the shift toward market incentives and 
additional discipline imposed on CEOs by the market will reduce the intensity of promotion 
incentives provided. This makes the incentives for the paid versus unpaid CEOs more similar. 
Because we expect unpaid CEOs to initially have the strongest promotion incentives, we expect 
that they will face the largest incentive change as market incentives displace promotion 
incentives.  
H4: Relative to the pre-Reform period, the probability of future promotion 
for unpaid CEOs decreases after the Reform.  
 
3. Data and sample selection 
Our initial sample consists of all local SOEs listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges between the years 1999 and 2011. A firm is a local SOE if its largest shareholder is 
the local governments or an entity whose ultimate owner is the local governments.7 We exclude 
firms in the financial industry and firms with missing information, resulting in a total of 8602 
final firm-year observations. 
We choose 1999 as the beginning of our sample period because that is when publicly-
listed firms in China started to systematically report executive compensation. We obtain our 
sample firms’ financial information, compensation information, and governance information 
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Following prior 
literature (Firth et al. 2006b; Kato and Long, 2006; and Ke et al. 2012), we refer the “chairperson 
of the board,” the highest-ranked executive in the database, as the CEO of the sample firm. We 
manually collect other executive characteristics from their published biographies. We also 
                                                          
7 We focus on local SOEs because there are greater promotion opportunities for CEOs of these firms. 
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manually collect information about each CEO’s next job position after he/she leaves the listed 
firm by reading the firms’ announcements and news reports. 
We separate our sample into unpaid and paid CEOs. We define a CEO as unpaid as 
unpaid if he/she receives no compensation from the listed firm, and as paid CEO if compensation 
is greater than zero. Table 1 contrasts the sample sizes of paid CEOs and unpaid CEOs by year.  
Among the total of 8,602 firm-year observations, 3,379 report that the CEO receives zero 
compensation from the firm where he/she works. This number comprises around 40% of our 
total sample, which is a surprisingly high portion. Further, the percentage of unpaid CEOs is 
quite stable across the sample period, indicating the persistence of this unusual compensation 
practice. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate analyses 
Table 2 provides some univariate statistics for the paid and unpaid CEO samples. We 
start by examining whether there are significant differences between the two groups on CEO 
personal characteristics. Unpaid CEOs are older and more likely to be male. On average, paid 
CEOs are 50.4 years old on average and unpaid CEOs are almost 51 years old. Both groups are 
predominately male, with 96.7% (96%) of unpaid (paid) CEOs being male. While these figures 
differ from a statistical perspective, the values are not economically different. However, there are 
much greater differences across the subsamples in other areas. Unpaid CEOs are more likely to 
have work experience in the Chinese government, including in the military (42.1% for unpaid 
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versus 34.6% for paid), implying a closer tie with the government than for paid CEOs.8 Unpaid 
CEOs are also less likely to hold dual positions (chairperson of the board and general manager) 
in the firm (2.0% for unpaid versus 18.9% for paid), indicating that they are less engaged in the 
operational aspects of the firm. Unpaid CEOs have an average tenure of 4.467 years at their firm, 
which is similar to the average tenure of paid CEOs (4.558 years). 77.4% of unpaid CEOs hold 
job title in the parent company of the listed firm, which is significantly higher than the 45.8% for 
paid CEOs. In addition to job titles in the listed firm and its subsidiaries, unpaid CEOs on 
average have 1.8 other job titles, which is more than 1.3 in paid CEOs.9 
Our second group of variables relates to the CEOs’ future chance of promotion. 
Promotion consists of two types: political promotion, i.e., promotion to a position as government 
official; and business promotion, i.e., a higher-level title in the parent group or an executive 
position at a larger firm. Overall, 8.6% of the unpaid CEOs experience a promotion, compared 
with only 2.7% of paid CEOs. This difference between the groups in the probability of future 
promotion (either political promotion or business promotion) after they leave the publicly-listed 
firms is both statistically and economically significant. When we further divide the probability of 
promotion into business and political promotions, the unpaid group exhibits significantly higher 
level of promotions in both categories than the paid group by 1.2% (for political promotions) and 
4.7% (for business promotions). This result provides preliminary evidence that these two groups 
of CEOs face different incentive schemes. Specifically, relative to their paid peers, the unpaid 
group is more likely to be incentivized by promotions rather than explicit pay.  
                                                          
8 We note, however, that there are a significant number of cases where the same CEO appears in our sample as paid 
in one year and unpaid in another year. This means that the choice of contract is not CEO-specific. We also find that 
the type of contract can differ from year to year within the same firm. 
9 Note that the CSMAR dataset only systematically provides information of job titles in other firms starting in 2001.  
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We find further differences across samples at the firm level. Firms with unpaid CEOs are 
significantly larger in size, with a mean total assets of RMB 4.5 billion, which is almost 10% 
higher than for firms with paid CEOs. The largest shareholder for firms with unpaid CEOs has 
an average stock holding of 45.5%, which is 4.5% more than the average government stock 
holding in the paid group. CEO share ownership is quite small for both groups, although 
statistically higher for paid CEOs.10 On average, the unpaid executives own 26,357 shares, 
significantly lower than 557,056 shares by the paid executives. The two groups of firms are 
similar with respect to the degree of leverage and the percentage of independent directors on 
board of directors.  
In general, operating performance is similar across samples. ROA and ROE does not 
significantly differ across groups, but the average sales growth for the unpaid group is more than 
4% higher than the sales growth of the firms with paid CEOs. Although both groups have a 
negative average stock return, the unpaid group’s return is about 2% less negative than the paid 
group. The unpaid group has significantly higher asset turnover than the paid group (0.7 versus 
0.654). Both groups have similar size in terms of change in total assets and change in the number 
of employees. Consistent with Luo et al. (2010), we measure administrative expenses (Admin 
Expense) as administrative expenses excluding any annual provisions of asset impairments and 
direct compensation for directors and top executives, deflated by total assets. Admin Expense 
does not significantly differ across groups. 
Finally, we compare the tunneling behavior of the two groups. Following Cheung et al 
(2010), Jiang et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010), we use two proxies for tunneling: 
                                                          
10 Many tech company founders such as Google’s Sergey Brin and Larry Page, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, 
Tesla’s Elon Musk, choose to receive zero compensation due to their enormous personal wealth, most likely created 
through their company share ownership shares. Clearly, this is not the case for Chinese CEOs, since these CEOs 
own very few shares or their companies. 
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“Transfer” and “OtherAR.” Transfer is defined as total amount of fund transfers through related 
party transactions from the listed firm to its parent company and/or other firms in the same group 
over total assets. OtherAR is defined as the firm’s balance of other receivables over total assets. 
We do not find any significant difference between the two groups in tunneling, as measured by 
the funds transferred from the listed firm to the parent company or other companies within the 
same group. However, we find a higher amount of average other receivables (which captures the 
outstanding balances owed by their parent firms or related companies in the same group) in the 
paid sample, which is consistent with a higher level of tunneling for the paid group.  
In sum, the univariate statistics in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that firms with 
unpaid CEOs have a higher probability of being promoted than their peers who are explicitly 
paid. These CEOs appear to have greater implicit incentives to perform. Unpaid CEOs are also 
more likely to have more work experience and closer ties with the Chinese government. 
However, the probability of unpaid CEO promotion to a position in business is almost three 
times higher than the probability of promotion to a government position. This supports our 
contention that political incentives are not driving the behaviors that we examine.  
4.2. Unpaid CEOs and future promotion 
We argue that unpaid CEOs in our sample are motivated and disciplined primarily 
through their career concerns, i.e., the chance of future promotion. Specifically, H1 explores the 
strength of this incentive and predicts that compared to their paid peers, unpaid CEOs have a 
higher probability of being promoted to a higher position. To test H1, we adopt the following 
baseline logistic regression model:  
Promotiont+1 = β0 + β1Nopayt + β2Aget + β3Gender + β4Dualt + β5ROAt + β6SalesGrowtht  
+ β7Sizet + β8Leveraget + β9Largestt + β10CEOsharet + β11Governmentt  
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+ εt                                                                                                              (1a)                                                                                                                                            
 
The dependent variable is the future probability of promotion (Promotion), which is 
measured by three different proxies: Promotion, PoliticalP and BusinessP. Promotion is a 
dummy variable that equals1 if the CEO leaves for a job in government, a higher position in the 
parent group, or an executive position of a larger firm in year t+1, and 0 otherwise. PoliticalP is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO leaves for a job in government in year t+1, and 0 
otherwise. BusinessP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO leaves for higher position in 
the parent group or executive position of a larger firm in year t+1, and 0 otherwise. The main 
independent variable, Nopay, represents the type of incentive the CEO faces, taking value 1 if 
the CEO is unpaid, and 0 otherwise.  
We include a battery of control variables to separate the promotion incentive from 
promotion based upon CEO characteristics and firm performance. Age is the CEO’s age. Gender 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is male, and 0 otherwise. Dual is a dummy variable, 
taking value of 1 if a chairman is also the general manager of the listed firm and 0 otherwise. 
Government is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO had worked for the government or 
military before joining the listed firm and 0 otherwise.11 ROA is the firm’s net income deflated 
by average assets. Sales growth is firm sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, deflated by sales in 
year t-1. Size is natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the firm’s 
total liabilities over total assets. Largest is the percentage of the firm’s stockholdings owned by 
the largest shareholder whose ultimate owner is the Chinese government. CEOshare is the 
percentage of shares owned by a CEO. We also include fixed effects for industry and year. 
                                                          
11 This variable has been used in prior research to investigate implicit incentives related to the CEO’s political 
connections (e.g., Li et al. 2008 and Hu and Leung 2009). 
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Table 3 provides the results of our regression model (1). We find that Nopay is positively 
and significantly related to all three measures of future promotion. Specifically, in the Promotion 
model (column 1), Nopay has a significant and positive coefficient of 0.521. Holding other 
variables at the mean value, marginal effect of Nopay indicates that being paid by the parent firm 
is associated with an increase of 4.5% in general promotion probability in the next year. The 
remaining columns separate promotions into political (PoliticalP in column 2) and business 
(BusinessP in column 3) promotions, we find being unpaid is associated with 0.6% (3.4%) 
probability of being promoted to a political (business) position. The probability of being 
promoted to a higher business position is likely higher than to a government position, because 
there are generally fewer political positions than business positions. AGE is significantly 
negatively associated with the probability of future promotion, likely because the Chinese 
government in principle does not promote any official that is older than 60 years of age.12 This 
explicit age cap has been imposed as part of the effort to lower Chinese government officials’ 
average age. As a result, older CEOs have a lower likelihood of promotion if they have exceeded 
or are closer to the mandated age cap. This effect is stronger in the PoliticalP model than in the 
BusinessP model since business promotions are less subject to the age cap.  
In addition, we find holding dual positions in a firm, Dual, significantly reduces the 
chance of a CEO’s future promotion for both business and political promotions. This is because 
the CEOs who only serve as chairpersons but not general managers are less involved in the 
operational details of the companies, and focus more on strategical issues that prepare them 
better for higher positions. The CEOs’ work experience in the government also plays a 
                                                          
12 The retirement age for government employees is 60 for male and 55 for female. Male (female) officials with 
higher rank than provincial governor can retire at 65 (60). 
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significant role in their future promotion, although only for political promotions; it has no 
significant effect on the chance of business promotion.  
Our results also indicate that company size is related only to the probability of political 
promotion. This may be because many Chinese SOEs aim to expand in size and CEOs of bigger 
firms are more likely to be perceived as successful. We also find that CEOs from a more highly 
leveraged firm are more likely receive a business promotion. 
We conduct several additional tests as robustness checks. The first test focuses on the 
effect of the mandatory retirement age cap for Chinese government officials. The logistic 
regression model we use is 
Promotiont+1 = β0 + β1Nopayt + β2Neart + β3NopaytxNeart + β4Gender + β5Dualt  
+ β6ROAt + β7Sales Growtht + β8Sizet + β9Leveraget + β10Largestt 
+ β11CEOsharet + β12Governmentt + ε t                                                       (1b) 
 
where Near is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if a CEO is older than 58 and 0 otherwise. 
Nopay x Near is the interaction term of Nopay and Near. The variable Near captures the CEO’s 
career horizon before mandatory retirement. A CEO’s career horizon plays a potentially 
important role in his/her incentive at work. A CEO that is close to retirement is more likely to 
play the “end game” resulting in a weakened incentive effect. This effect is especially 
pronounced in the Chinese setting due to the mandatory age cap for government officials. If the 
incentive effect of having an unpaid policy is effective, we expect that it will mitigate the 
retirement effect. 
As expected, we find that while Nopay remains significantly positive, Near is 
significantly negatively related with all three models for future promotion.  This result confirms 
that a CEO closer to mandatory retirement age is less likely to be promoted. Note that the 
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magnitude of the coefficient estimate and the level of statistical significance are both especially 
strong in the case of PoliticalP, which is consistent with political promotion being most severely 
subjected to the age cap. Further, the interaction term Nopay x Near is significantly and 
positively related to PoliticalP, indicating that even near the mandatory retirement age, unpaid 
CEOs are still more likely to be promoted to a political position.  
Although we control for CEO characteristics such as age, tenure, and government or 
military experience, it is possible that the results presented in tables 3-4 are driven by selection 
of candidates, namely, that better candidates for promotion are given unpaid positions. A CEO 
may be pre-selected into a certain incentive mechanism due to his/her personal traits. For 
example, he/she may exhibit a particularly strong political ambition and may respond more to an 
implicit incentive mechanism rather than to explicit pay. To begin to address this issue, we 
examine a subsample of CEOs whose compensation contracts have been switched, either from 
paid to unpaid or from unpaid to paid. The switch of contracts offers a unique setting to control 
for any pre-selection effect. As before, we control for CEO characteristics and firm performance 
to isolate the promotion incentive. Controlling for these factors, we expect to see a decrease 
(increase) in the probability of promotion when the CEO switches from unpaid to paid (paid to 
unpaid) which would be consistent with a greater use of promotion incentives when the CEO is 
unpaid. 
Using subsamples of CEOs who switched contracts, matched with CEOs who did not 
switch, our logistic regression model is  
Promotion = β0 + β1Switch + β2Age + β3Gender + β4Dual + β5ROA 
+ β6Sales Growth + β7Size + β8Leverage + β9Largest + β10CEOshare  
+ β11Government + ε                                                                                  (1c) 
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where Switch is one of two variables: Nopay to Pay and Pay to Nopay. For CEOs switching from 
unpaid to paid, we match with CEOs who are unpaid during their entire tenure, and construct the 
dummy variable Nopay to Pay, which equals 1 if a CEO receives a positive salary and 0 
otherwise. For CEOs switching from paid to unpaid, we match CEOs who switch from paid to 
unpaid with CEOs who are paid during their entire tenures, and construct the dummy variable 
Pay to Nopay, which equals 1 if a CEO receives no salary and 0 otherwise.13 We expect Nopay 
to Pay to be negatively associated with a CEO’s future chance of promotion, and Pay to Nopay 
to have positive association. 
Table 5 reports results of the promotion analysis for CEOs switching from unpaid to paid 
versus their matched unpaid peers. We find that switching from unpaid to paid (Nopay to Pay = 1) 
has a negative effect on a CEO’s future chance of business promotion. Specifically, switching 
from a no pay contract to a paid contract is associated with a 1.3% reduction in the probability of 
future business promotion. 14 
Table 6 reports regression results for CEOs switching from paid to unpaid versus their 
matched paid peers. Pay to Nopay has significant positive coefficients for all the measures of 
promotion. Column (1)-(3) indicate a 4.3% increase in the overall likelihood of promotion, 
mainly driven by a business promotion (an increase of 3.0%). 
Another factor that may impact promotion decisions for our sample firms is turnover in 
the local government. Such turnover creates uncertainty regarding promotion decisions for 
existing SOE CEOs. New political leaders may reevaluate the competence and the loyalty of 
                                                          
13 Most CEOs who switch do so only once. Consideration of multiple switches does not impact our inferences. 
14 It is possible that the change in contract results from a secondary selection mechanism. We examine the impact of 
a change in the strength of the promotion and market incentives in our test of hypothesis H4 to further isolate 
changes in incentives from other factors that may affect the probability of promotion. 
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existing subordinates, which potentially results in greater turnover in SOEs. On the other hand, if 
an unpaid executive has pre-arranged career path, turnovers within the political hierarchy 
provide good timing to fulfill the arrangements. We construct a dummy variable to measure 
government turnover, Local Turnover, which takes value 1 if there is a turnover of governor in 
the province where the ultimate controlling owner of a listed firm resides, and zero otherwise. 
Columns (1) - (3) of Table 7 suggest that government turnover significantly reduces the 
probability of promotion, primarily for political promotions. After controlling the uncertainty 
from government turnover, however, we continue to find evidence that unpaid CEOs have a 
higher promotion probability. To mitigate the concerns of selection effect, we further control the 
number of job titles in other firms including the parent company. Our results remain qualitatively 
the same. 
In summary, the analyses on CEOs’ incentive method and future promotion provide 
evidence in support of H1, that unpaid CEOs have strong incentives related to their career 
concerns. Our results indicate while they may not receive performance-based pay in the current 
period, unpaid CEOs enjoy a significantly higher probability of being promoted.  
4.3. Unpaid CEOs and firm performance 
In this section, we examine the potential impact of the CEO’s incentive mechanism on 
the firm’s financial performance. Assuming the two different types of incentive mechanism are 
applied appropriately in equilibrium, there should be no difference in the CEOs’ performance 
outcome, ceteris paribus. However, our univariate analysis indicates that CEOs with promotion 
incentives perform marginally better than their paid peers. To more formally test H2, we adopt 
the following regression model: 
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Performancet = β0 + β1Nopayt + β2Aget + β3Dualt + β4Sizet + β5Leveraget  
+ β6Largestt + β7CEOSharet + β8Governmentt +β9Idirectort+ εt              (2) 
 
where Performance is measured with different variables, depending on the hypothesis we are 
testing. For tests of H2a, Performance is either ROA, which is defined as the firm’s net income 
deflated by its average assets, or RET, which is the firm’s annual buy and hold stock return 
adjusted by market return. For our test of H2b, Performance is Asset turnover, which is total 
sales divided by average total assets. For our tests of H2c, Performance is Sales growth, which is 
the firm’s sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, then deflated by sales in year t-1; ΔAssets, the 
percentage change in total assets; and ΔEmployees, log change in the number of employees. 
These variables capture different aspect of firm performance, especially given the specific nature 
of Chinese SOEs. ROA is the traditional accounting measure for a firm’s profitability. RET 
captures a firm’s success from the perspective of the financial market. Asset turnover measures 
how efficient the firm can turn its assets into sales. Sales growth, ΔAssets and ΔEmployees 
measure how fast a firm’s business is expanding. Expansion is especially meaningful for SOEs, 
since government-owned enterprises are well-known to emphasize growth in business scale.  
Results for regression model 2 are presented in Table 8.  We focus our discussion on our 
variable of interest, Nopay. Among the six measures of the firm performance, ROA is to be 
positively associated with Nopay with a statistical significance at 5% level. Specifically, having 
an unpaid CEO is associated with 0.4% increase in a firm’s return on assets, after controlling for 
other important variables. Moreover, Nopay is positively associated with Asset turnover, which 
is significant at the 10% level. Results reported in column (3) indicate that the ratio of sales to 
total assets increases 1.7% for an unpaid CEO. We also find that Nopay is positively associated 
with ΔAsset, which is significant at the 1% level, implying that an unpaid CEO is associated 
with 3.4% of growth in the company’s asset growth. However, Nopay is not significant in 
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explaining stock return, sales growth, or the change in the company’s number of employees. In 
sum, we find that firms with unpaid CEOs do not perform worse than firms with paid CEOs. We 
provide some evidence that firms with unpaid CEOs outperform the control group along some 
dimensions of performance. We thus find some support for hypotheses H2a-H2c. 
In addition to our variables of interest, several of the control variables are significantly 
related to the different performance measures. Company size (Size) is generally positive and 
significant in explaining firm performance, indicating that larger firms tend to perform better. 
Leverage is generally negatively associated with firm performance, implying that a more 
indebted firm is less likely to perform well. The percentage of government ownership, Largest, is 
positively and significantly associated with all measures of firm performance except stock return. 
Thus the more shares the Chinese government has in a firm, the better the firm seems to perform 
along some dimensions. We also control for the characteristics of the CEOs in explaining firm 
performance outcomes. Although CEO share ownership in Chinese SOE firms is generally low, 
ownership (CEOShare) is positively associated with sales growth and asset growth, and 
marginally associated with return on assets. Whether a CEO holds dual titles in a firm (Dual) is 
only very marginally associated with some measure of performance (RET and Asset turnover at 
10% significance, and ΔEmployees at 5% significance). The CEO’s age has mixed results and 
does not seem to consistently impact firm performance. Whether a CEO has a government 
background is positively related to sales growth and change of employee numbers at the 5% 
level of significance.  
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4.4. Unpaid CEOs and Tunneling 
Hypothesis H3 explores the association between CEO incentives and tunneling behavior. 
Because we provide arguments for consistent with tunneling by firms with unpaid CEOs being 
either greater than or less than firms with paid CEOs, we do not have any specific sign 
predictions for our analysis.  We estimate the following regression model: 
Tunnelingt = β0 + β1Nopayt + β2Aget + β3Dualt + β4Sizet+ β5Leveraget+ β6Largestt  
+ β7CEOSharet + β8Governmentt + β9Idirectort + εt                     (3) 
 
Following Cheung et al (2010), Jiang et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010), we use two 
proxies for tunneling: “Transfer” and “OtherAR”. Transfer is defined as total amount of fund 
transfers through related party transactions from the listed firm to its parent company and/or 
other firms in the same group over total assets. OtherAR is defined as the firm’s balance of other 
receivables over total assets.  
Table 9 presents results of estimating regression model 3. Results indicate that Nopay is 
significantly negatively associated with Transfer, indicating that companies with unpaid CEOs 
engage in less tunneling in the form of net asset transfer to parent firms. Specifically, having an 
unpaid CEO is associated with an average 0.6% less net transfer to the related parties, who 
include the parent company and other firms in the same group. Nopay is not significantly related 
to OtherAR.  
While our univariate results indicate a non-zero level of tunneling for our firms, we find 
that firms with larger levels of government ownership are less likely to extort funds for the 
benefit of the SOE parent. Combined with less tunneling related to unpaid executives, our results 
indicate the importance to consider incentives mechanism implemented by largest shareholders 
of business groups.  
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4.6 The Split Share Structure Reform 
 While the results we report are consistent with unpaid CEOs having stronger implicit 
(career-related incentives) and that companies with unpaid CEOs exhibit different performance 
along some dimensions, there are some unresolved issues in interpreting our results. For example, 
the result that CEOs that switch between paid and unpaid regimes face different probabilities of 
(and hence incentives based upon) promotion may be indicative of a secondary sorting by the 
companies. CEOs who are originally viewed as less (more) talented and given a “paid” 
(“unpaid”) position, but then are elevated (reduced) to an “unpaid” (“paid”) position once their 
true type becomes known, would produce results similar to those reported in our tables 5 and 6. 
Our controls for CEO characteristics and firm performance in those models may not fully control 
for this possibility. To provide some additional insights, we examine a setting where the relative 
strength of the implicit (career concern) incentives and explicit (market) incentives changes due 
to exogenous changes in the regulatory environment.  
The Split Share Structure Reform is the most significant reform of the Chinese financial 
market in recent years. As we conjecture in hypothesis 4, due to the strengthening of market 
incentives for SOEs, the Reform may impact the SOE firms’ compensation and incentive 
practice for their executives.15 Specifically, since the Reform strengthens external monitoring, 
we expect the implicit promotion incentives for the unpaid CEOs to be relatively weakened.  
The Reform provides a nice setting to test implicit incentives because it experienced a 
staggered adoption process. Different firms complete the reform at different points in time. From 
the start of the Reform on April 29, 2005, 403 firms finished by the end of 2005, additional 866 
                                                          
15 It is interesting that before the reform, 37.78% of CEOs received no pay. After the reform, the ratio increases to 
41.36%. This increase is significant at the 1% level. 
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firms finished by the end of 2006, 103 firms in 2007, 29 firms in 2008, 17 firms between 2009 
and 2011. By the end of 2012, there were 10 firms still subject to the completion of the Reform.  
To test H4, we adopt the following regression model: 
Promotion = β0 + β1Nopay + β2Reform + β3Nopay x Reform + β4Age + β5Gender  
+ β6Dual + β7ROA + β8Sales Growth + β9Size + β10Leverage  
+ β11Largest+ β12CEOshare + β13Government + ε                                    (4) 
 
where Reform is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s stocks owned by the Chinese 
government are tradable in the stock market, and 0 otherwise. Nopay x Reform is an interaction 
term between Nopay and Reform. If the Reform weakens the use of promotion incentives for 
unpaid CEOs, we would expect to see a negative coefficient of the interaction term.  
Table 10 provides the result of regression model 4. Similar to in the previous analyses, 
the variable Nopay is positive and significant in all three columns for predicting the CEOs’ 
future chance of promotion. Consistent with H4, the coefficient of Nopay x Reform is 
significantly negative in all regressions, indicating a reduced probability of all types of 
promotion for unpaid CEOs. Note that Reform is insignificant in all three regressions, implying 
no significant change in the probability of CEO promotion after the Reform for paid CEOs.16  
Interestingly, F tests of Reform + Nopay x Reform suggest that after the reform, there is no 
difference in the probability of promotion between being paid and unpaid, although unpaid CEOs 
still enjoy a higher probability of promotions within business. This result indicates that the 
incentives provided to paid and unpaid CEOs became more similar after the Reform. 
                                                          
16 Disclosure requirements for compensation information underwent several changes during our sample period. 
From 1999 to 2001, Chinese listed firms were only required to disclose a range of compensation for their CEOs. 
From 2001 to 2005, disclosure requirements were expanded to include the sum of total compensation for the three 
highest-paid executives. Finally, starting from 2006, all listed firms are required to report each individual executive's 
total compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus, stipends, and other benefits. Since unpaid CEOs’ 
compensation was not disclosed until 2012, which is after our sample period, changes in disclosure do not affect our 
tests of H4. 
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As an additional test, we investigate the impact of the Reform on firm performance. As 
market incentives become more important for all firms, there may be a greater focus on financial 
performance. We thus expect an improvement in financial performance for all companies. This 
improvement may be different across firms with paid versus unpaid CEOs, however. As market 
incentives become stronger after the Reform and consistent with our results in table 10, 
differences in incentives for paid versus unpaid CEOs likely become less extreme. If so, there 
should be less difference in financial performance between the two sets of firms. In addition, 
market objectives, such as improved ROA should become more important than SOE-specific 
objectives, such as sales growth, or tunneling. The model we estimate is: 
Performance/
Tunneling 
= β0 + β1Nopay + β2Reform + β3Nopay x Reform + β4Age + β5Dual  
+ β6Size + β7Leverage + β8Largest + β9CEOShare + β10Government 
+β11Idirectort + ε                                                                                     (5) 
 
 Table 11 summarizes the results for estimation of model 5. In these tests, we use a 
subsample of firms whose executives are constant before and after the Reform to isolate changes 
in firm behavior associated with the regulatory reform. Similar to the test result of H2, Nopay is 
significant and positive on ROA, indicating that prior to the Reform, firms with unpaid CEOs 
outperformed firms with paid CEOs. The coefficient of Reform (for paid CEOs) is significantly 
positive and the sum of coefficients of Reform and Reform x Nopay (for unpaid CEOs) is 
insignificant. This indicates that following the reform, firms with unpaid CEOs “caught up” with 
their paid peers with respect to ROA performance. Interestingly, the reform also impacted 
market returns (RET); both the coefficients of Reform (for paid CEOs) and the sum of 
coefficients of Reform and Reform x Nopay (for unpaid CEOs) are significantly positive. This 
suggests an increase in the effect of market incentives. In the Sales Growth model, the 
coefficient of Nopay x Reform is significantly negative, indicating that firms with unpaid CEOs 
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reduced their sales growth. This is consistent with movement away from SOE-specific incentives 
toward market incentives. Indeed, none of the sums of the coefficients of Nopay and Nopay x 
Reform for Column(1)-(6) in Table 11 is statistically different from zero, indicating there is no 
difference in financial performance between firms with paid versus unpaid CEOs following the 
Reform. This provides support for our hypothesis of firm performance becoming more similar 
across firms following the Reform. 
 The final two columns of Table 11 present results of regression model (5) using two 
different measures of tunneling. Model 7 of the table provides evidence that our earlier results 
(Table 9) of less tunneling via inter-company transfers for firms with unpaid CEOs were driven 
by the post-Reform period. This is consistent with a reduction in tunneling behavior following 
the Reform. In model (8), results indicate that the insignificant results in Table 9 for tunneling 
via inter-company loans (Accounts Receivable) were due to differences across periods, with 
significantly higher tunneling in firms with unpaid CEOs prior to the Reform (Reform = 0.007, p 
< 0.05), and a significant reduction following the reform (Nopay x Reform  = -0.008, p < 0.01). 
Results also indicate that companies with paid CEOs reduced their tunneling activities via inter-
company loans following the Reform.  
In summary, we find that the Split Share Structure Reform has provided stronger link 
between executive incentives and stock market performance for all firms. In the course of doing 
so, it weakened the strength of future promotion as an incentive mechanism for SOE CEOs. 
Consistent with this argument, we find that the probabilities of future promotion for unpaid 
CEOs generally decreased following the Reform. This implies that the Chinese government is 
now relying on more market-based incentives to motivate the SOEs’ executives. Further, we find 
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the superior financial performance related to unpaid CEOs has also diminished after the Reform. 
We also find an overall reduction in tunneling activities. 
4.7. Executive perquisites, firm performance and tunneling 
In addition to monetary compensation, executives enjoy perquisites. Chinese listed firms 
may compensate their unpaid CEOs through non-cash perquisites. Since these perks have 
performance implications (Yermack 2006; Rajan and Wulf 2006), incentives from perks 
potentially explain our results on performance. To mitigate this alternative explanation, we 
construct a proxy for perks, Mperk.  
Unlike US, China does not require listed firms to disclose executive perks. Therefore, we 
rely on administrative expense (Admin Expense) to estimate the amount of perks. Following Luo 
et al. (2011), we regard the abnormal level of administrative expenses as Mperk. The normal 
level of administrative expenses (Nexp) is estimated by using the following equation for each 
year and for each industry:
 
0 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1
5
Admin expense 1
                                                                                                
t t t t
t t t t t
t
Sales PPE Inv
Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
LnEmployee
β β β β β
β
− − − − −
∆
= + + + +
+           (5)
 
Admin Expenset is total administrative expenses excluding annual provisions of asset 
impairments and direct compensation for directors and top executives; Assetst-1 is lagged total 
assets; △Salest is change in sales; PPEt is net value of Property, Plant and Equipment; Invt is 
yearend value of inventories; LnEmployeet is natural log of number of employees. Mperk is 
calculated as the difference between Admin Expense and Nexp. 
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 Table 12 presents the results on the impact of executive perks. After controlling executive 
perks, we find the results remain qualitatively unchanged and that firms with unpaid CEOs have 
higher ROA, higher asset turnover, and lower degree of tunneling.  
5. Conclusion 
We examine an unusual phenomenon of Chinese executives receiving zero pay from the 
firms for whom they work. We find that these CEOs are strongly motivated and disciplined by 
career concerns, i.e., the opportunity of future promotion. Indeed, compared to their paid peers, 
unpaid CEOs have three times higher probability of being promoted to a higher position. When 
we examine the outcomes of the incentive mechanism of the unpaid CEOs, we find that firms 
with unpaid CEOs outperform their peer firms, and engage in less tunneling activities.  
To provide additional evidence regarding promotion-related incentives, we conduct an 
event study using the Split Share Structure Reform in 2006. This reform resulted in a 
strengthening of market incentives for all SOEs in China. We posit and find evidence consistent 
with this increased in emphasis on market incentives resulting in movement away from use of 
promotion incentives. Our evidence indicates a reduction in the use of promotion incentives, 
with the probability of promotion for unpaid CEOs declining following the Reform. Further, 
consistent with movement away from SOE-related incentives and toward market incentives, we 
find that after the Reform, performance characteristics including financial performance (ROA, 
stock market returns, and sales growth) and tunneling in the form of inter-company loans with 
the parent become more similar for firms that have paid versus unpaid CEOs.  
Our results shed light into the unique executive compensation mechanisms in Chinese 
SOEs, and provide an explanation of how unpaid CEOs can have as strong an incentive based 
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upon career concerns as based upon conventional explicit incentives. We show that the concerns 
raised by the Chinese popular press are ungrounded, and that the firms with unpaid CEOs 
perform at least as well as the control group with paid CEOs.  
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Appendix A: Illustration of the structure of a local SOE  
Tianjin Teda Corp is a listed SOE, stock code 000652. It is controlled by the government of 
Tianjin city through two layers. The following figure illustrates the ownership structure: 
  
 
 
 
         
 
Huiwen Liu was the chairman of Tianjin Teda Corp from 1997 to 2011, receiving no 
compensation from the listed firm. He was also the chairman of Teda Investment Holding Co. 
from 2006 to 2011. In May 2011, at the age of 57, he resigned all his titles to become the 
chairman of Bohai Property Insurance Co., an unlisted SOE with a revenue of RMB1.5 billion, 
which is much smaller than the RMB51 billion revenue of Tianjin Teda Corp. His successor, Jun 
Zhang, the general manager of Teda Group Co. since 2008, became the chairman of Tianjin Teda 
Corp. Jun Zhang did not receive compensation from the listed firm either. After two-year service 
at the listed firm, at the age of 46, he was promoted to vice president of Teda Investment Holding 
in Feb. 2013.  
SASAC of Tianjin 
 
Teda Investment Holding Co., Ltd 
Teda Group Co., Ltd 
Tianjin Teda Corporation 
100% 
100% 
33.75% 
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Table 1 Sample Distribution 
  Paid CEOs Unpaid CEOs Total 
1999 365 233 598 
2000 399 276 675 
2001 433 277 710 
2002 443 266 709 
2003 438 253 691 
2004 445 241 686 
2005 412 251 663 
2006 398 236 634 
2007 393 256 649 
2008 367 276 643 
2009 371 268 639 
2010 375 280 655 
2011 384 266 650 
Total 5223 3379 8602 
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Table 2 Comparison between firms with paid chairman and firms with unpaid chairman  
  Unpaid CEO (1) Paid CEO (2)   
  N Mean median N Mean median (2) - (1) 
Age 3379 50.955 51 5223 50.41 51 -0.545*** 
Gender 3379 0.967 1 5223 0.96 1 -0.007* 
Government 3379 0.421 0 5223 0.346 0 -0.075*** 
Dual 3379 0.02 0 5223 0.189 0 0.170*** 
Tenure 3379 4.467 3 5223 4.558 4 0.091 
Shareholdertitle 2869 0.774 1 4455 0.458 0 -0.316*** 
Titles 2869 1.765 1 4455 1.294 1 -0.471*** 
Promotion 3379 0.086 0 5223 0.027 0 -0.059*** 
BusinessP 3379 0.063 0 5223 0.016 0 -0.048*** 
PoliticalP 3379 0.023 0 5223 0.011 0 -0.011*** 
Assets (billions) 3379 4.576 2.091 5223 3.979 1.717 -0.596*** 
Leverage 3379 0.506 0.496 5222 0.505 0.501 -0.001 
CEOshare 3379 0.000 0 5223 0.001 0 0.001*** 
Largest 3379 0.453 0.455 5223 0.41 0.396 -0.043*** 
Idirector 3379 0.282 0.333 5223 0.28 0.333 -0.002 
ROA 3379 0.031 0.033 5223 0.028 0.031 -0.002 
Sales growth 3379 0.227 0.134 5223 0.184 0.138 -0.043*** 
RET 3379 -0.016 -0.052 5223 -0.036 -0.058 -0.020** 
ROE 3378 0.049 0.068 5222 0.042 0.065 -0.006 
Asset turnover 3379 0.7 0.575 5222 0.654 0.537 -0.047*** 
Δassets 3379 0.167 0.09 5222 0.159 0.092 -0.009 
Δemployees 3026 -0.026 0 4606 -0.006 0.008 0.02 
Admin Expense 3379 0.046 0.038 5222 0.047 0.039 0.001 
Transfer 3379 0.006 0 5222 0.008 0 0.002 
OtherRA 3379 0.05 0.018 5222 0.054 0.023 0.004** 
Age: a CEO’s age; Gender: dummy variable, 1 if a CEO is male; Government, a dummy variable, 1 if a 
CEO worked for government or military; Dual: dummy variable, 1 if the chairman is also general 
manager; Tenure, the number of years as CEO; Shareholdertitle, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO has a job 
title in parent company; Titles, the number of titles a CEO has other than those in a listed firm; 
Promotion, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO leaves for a job in government, higher position in the parent 
group, executive position of a larger firm in year t+1; PoliticalP, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO leaves for 
a job in government in year t+1; BusinessP, a dummy variable, 1 if a CEO leaves for higher position in 
the parent group or executive position of a larger firm in year t+1; Assets, total assets in billions; 
Leverage, total liabilities deflated by total assets; CEOshare: the percentage of stocks owned by a CEO; 
Largest: the percentage of stocks owned by the largest shareholder; Idirector, the percentage of 
independent directors on board of directors; ROA: net income deflated by average assets; Sales growth: 
sales in year t minus sales in year t-1, deflated by sales in year t-1; RET: annual buy and hold stock return 
adjusted by market return; Asset turnover: total sales divided by average total assets; Δassets: percentage 
change in total assets; Δemployees: log change in number of employees; Admin Expense: administrative 
expenses excluding annual provisions for asset impairments and total executive and director 
compensation, deflated by total assets; Transfer: funds transferred from the listed firm to its parent 
company and/or other firms in the same group; OtherRA: other receivables divided by total assets.   
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Table 3 Regression Results on Future Promotion 
This table presents results of probit regression on future promotion. Promotion is a dummy variable, 1 if 
chairman leaves for a job in government in year t+1, higher position in the parent group, or executive 
position of a larger firm and otherwise zero. PoliticalP is a dummy variable, 1 if chairman leaves for a job 
in government in year t+1 and otherwise zero. BusinessP is a dummy variable, 1 if chairman leaves for 
higher position in the parent group or executive position of a larger firm in year t+1 and otherwise zero. 
We control fixed effects of industry and year. Z statistics based on robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Nopay 0.521*** 0.224*** 0.594*** 
 (10.06) (2.86) (9.92) 
Age -0.699*** -1.096*** -0.402** 
 (-4.27) (-4.56) (-2.20) 
Gender -0.024 0.022 -0.044 
 (-0.18) (0.11) (-0.31) 
Dual -0.457*** -0.291** -0.554*** 
 (-4.19) (-2.13) (-3.81) 
ROA 0.096 -0.684 0.352 
 (0.20) (-1.00) (0.66) 
Sales growth -0.062 0.053 -0.122** 
 (-1.12) (0.68) (-1.98) 
Size 0.027 0.152*** -0.026 
 (0.99) (3.73) (-0.85) 
Leverage 0.205 -0.350* 0.379** 
 (1.49) (-1.78) (2.52) 
Largest 0.149 0.259 0.027 
 (0.94) (1.06) (0.15) 
CEOshare -1.721 -5.553 -1.123 
 (-0.32) (-0.44) (-0.19) 
Government 0.157*** 0.548*** -0.090 
 (2.93) (6.68) (-1.46) 
Constant 0.574 -0.901 0.163 
 (0.72) (-0.83) (0.17) 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.099 0.097 
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Table 4 Impact of Retirement on promotion decision 
Promotion, a dummy variable, 1 if chairman leaves for a job in government in year t+1, higher position in 
the parent group, or executive position of a larger firm and otherwise zero. PoliticalP is a dummy variable, 
1 if chairman leaves for a job in government in year t+1 and otherwise zero. BusinessP is a dummy 
variable, 1 if chairman leaves for higher position in the parent group or executive position of a larger firm 
in year t+1 and otherwise zero. Near, a dummy variable, equals to 1 if a CEO is older than 58 and zero 
otherwise. We control fixed effects of year and industry. Z statistics based on robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Nopay 0.499*** 0.193** 0.582*** 
 (9.33) (2.41) (9.37) 
Near -0.516*** -3.558*** -0.315* 
 (-2.93) (-31.39) (-1.74) 
No pay x Near 0.256 3.279*** 0.084 
 (1.25) (15.41) (0.39) 
Gender 0.153*** 0.548*** -0.093 
 (2.85) (6.65) (-1.50) 
Dual -0.468*** -0.300** -0.566*** 
 (-4.30) (-2.19) (-3.91) 
ROA 0.084 -0.763 0.344 
 (0.17) (-1.11) (0.64) 
Sales growth 0.203 -0.362* 0.375** 
 (1.47) (-1.82) (2.49) 
Size -0.007 0.046 -0.032 
 (-0.05) (0.23) (-0.22) 
Leverage 0.024 0.154*** -0.028 
 (0.89) (3.69) (-0.93) 
Largest -0.063 0.054 -0.122** 
 (-1.13) (0.69) (-1.97) 
CEOshare 0.143 0.273 0.014 
 (0.89) (1.11) (0.08) 
Government -0.358* -0.714** -0.131 
 (-1.84) (-2.53) (-0.60) 
Constant -1.651 -4.734 -1.110 
 (-0.31) (-0.42) (-0.18) 
Test: Near + No pay x Near = 0 
χ2 4.55** 1.97 2.99* 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.108 0.099 
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Table 5 Switching from No Pay to being Paid and Future Promotion 
This table uses a subsample of CEOs who change from no pay to pay during their tenures and CEOs who 
receive no pay during their tenures. No pay to pay, a dummy variable if a CEO receives any salary and 
zero otherwise. We control fixed effects of industry and year. Z statistics based on robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
No pay to Pay -0.153 0.139 -0.286** 
 (-1.50) (1.00) (-2.33) 
Age -0.723*** -1.459*** -0.325 
 (-3.12) (-4.12) (-1.28) 
Gender -0.190 -0.157 -0.169 
 (-1.06) (-0.59) (-0.83) 
Dual -0.473** -0.403 -0.478* 
 (-2.17) (-1.08) (-1.95) 
ROA 0.519 0.130 0.524 
 (0.89) (0.14) (0.82) 
Sales growth -0.075 0.043 -0.117* 
 (-1.18) (0.45) (-1.75) 
Size -0.006 0.138** -0.060 
 (-0.18) (2.54) (-1.49) 
Leverage 0.281* -0.339 0.429** 
 (1.66) (-1.38) (2.33) 
Largest 0.093 0.064 0.054 
 (0.43) (0.19) (0.22) 
CEOshare -2.392 -27.787 5.159 
 (-0.10) (-0.68) (0.21) 
Government 0.096 0.632*** -0.171** 
 (1.41) (5.54) (-2.25) 
Constant 1.714 -2.602* 1.231 
 (1.51) (-1.72) (0.97) 
Observations 3,524 3,524 3,524 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.108 0.065 
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Table 6 Change from being Paid to No Pay and Future Promotion 
This table uses a subsample of CEOs who change from pay to no pay during their tenures and CEOs who 
receive salaries during their tenures. Pay to no pay, a dummy variable if a CEO receives no salary and 
zero otherwise. We control fixed effects of industry and year. Z statistics based on robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Pay to No Pay 0.563*** 0.300* 0.634*** 
 (5.13) (1.82) (5.21) 
Age -0.717*** -0.942*** -0.501* 
 (-3.03) (-2.80) (-1.87) 
Gender 0.152 0.240 0.056 
 (0.72) (0.64) (0.24) 
Dual -0.428*** -0.253* -0.566*** 
 (-3.44) (-1.70) (-3.11) 
ROA -0.602 -1.975* 0.253 
 (-0.73) (-1.92) (0.26) 
Sales growth -0.061 0.052 -0.169 
 (-0.54) (0.42) (-1.14) 
Size 0.089** 0.204*** 0.033 
 (2.23) (3.53) (0.73) 
Leverage 0.006 -0.535* 0.292 
 (0.02) (-1.74) (1.05) 
Largest 0.356 0.558 0.162 
 (1.46) (1.51) (0.60) 
CEOshare -0.527 -2.349 -0.880 
 (-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.13) 
Government 0.206** 0.458*** -0.001 
 (2.29) (3.63) (-0.01) 
Constant -0.741 -2.611* -0.791 
 (-0.64) (-1.85) (-0.56) 
Observations 5,077 5,077 5,077 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.129 0.100 
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Table 7 Robustness Tests of promotion decision 
Promotion, PoliticalP and BusinessP are dummy variables for promotion. Idirector is the percentage of 
independent director on the board. Admin expense, a proxy for perks, is administrative expenses minus 
total executive compensation and annual provisions for asset impairments, deflated by total assets. Local 
Turnover is a dummy variable, 1 if there is a governor turnover in the province that ultimately controls a 
firm. Titles is the number of job titles a CEO has in other firms. We control fixed effects of year and 
industry. Z statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Nopay 0.520*** 0.225*** 0.594*** 0.508*** 0.220** 0.581*** 
 (10.04) (2.86) (9.91) (8.76) (2.55) (8.64) 
Age -0.706*** -1.118*** -0.405** -0.663*** -1.039*** -0.413* 
 (-4.31) (-4.65) (-2.22) (-3.50) (-3.68) (-1.95) 
Gender -0.020 0.026 -0.042 -0.010 -0.095 0.030 
 (-0.15) (0.13) (-0.29) (-0.07) (-0.45) (0.18) 
Dual -0.456*** -0.292** -0.553*** -0.505*** -0.463** -0.495*** 
 (-4.18) (-2.13) (-3.81) (-3.60) (-2.29) (-2.96) 
ROA 0.111 -0.681 0.360 -0.085 -0.964 0.200 
 (0.23) (-0.99) (0.68) (-0.16) (-1.25) (0.33) 
Sales growth -0.061 0.055 -0.122** -0.026 0.100 -0.093 
 (-1.10) (0.71) (-1.98) (-0.42) (1.15) (-1.30) 
Size 0.026 0.151*** -0.026 0.032 0.163*** -0.021 
 (0.98) (3.67) (-0.85) (1.12) (3.72) (-0.64) 
Leverage 0.209 -0.349* 0.381** 0.102 -0.383* 0.262 
 (1.53) (-1.76) (2.54) (0.66) (-1.68) (1.58) 
Largest 0.149 0.265 0.026 0.124 0.028 0.122 
 (0.94) (1.08) (0.14) (0.68) (0.10) (0.61) 
CEOshare -1.893 -5.878 -1.217 -1.658 -3.200 -1.503 
 (-0.34) (-0.46) (-0.20) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.25) 
Government 0.156*** 0.552*** -0.092 0.150** 0.547*** -0.086 
 (2.90) (6.72) (-1.49) (2.50) (5.88) (-1.25) 
Local Turnover -0.134** -0.249** -0.066 -0.152** -0.285*** -0.077 
 (-2.12) (-2.48) (-0.95) (-2.22) (-2.60) (-1.03) 
Titles    0.007 0.002 0.012 
    (0.51) (0.09) (0.82) 
Constant 0.635 -0.733 0.186 -0.081 -1.391 -0.403 
 (0.80) (-0.68) (0.20) (-0.09) (-1.11) (-0.38) 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 7,323 7,323 7,323 
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.103 0.097 0.085 0.107 0.094 
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Table 8 Regression Results on Performance  
We control fixed effects of firm, year and industry. T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 ROA RET Asset turnover Sales growth ΔAssets ΔEmployees 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Nopay 0.004** 0.025 0.017* 0.031 0.034*** -0.015 
 (2.01) (1.59) (1.93) (1.63) (3.12) (-0.52) 
Age 0.019*** -0.040 -0.027 -0.180*** -0.047 -0.129 
 (2.78) (-0.78) (-0.89) (-2.82) (-1.22) (-1.25) 
Dual 0.002 0.036* 0.020* -0.024 0.022 0.086** 
 (0.74) (1.77) (1.67) (-1.08) (1.52) (2.35) 
Size 0.012*** -0.018 -0.006 0.102*** 0.163*** 0.165*** 
 (5.47) (-1.32) (-0.66) (5.64) (14.61) (6.55) 
Leverage -0.176*** -0.072 -0.108*** 0.036 -0.144*** -0.055 
 (-21.62) (-1.58) (-4.11) (0.58) (-4.06) (-0.67) 
Largest 0.059*** 0.028 0.109** 0.300** 0.220*** 0.273** 
 (6.02) (0.34) (2.33) (2.50) (3.41) (2.07) 
CEO share 0.839* -1.562 0.524 8.431** 14.765*** 2.738 
 (1.70) (-0.29) (0.21) (2.36) (2.69) (0.48) 
Government 0.002 -0.010 -0.019 0.046** 0.015 0.064** 
 (0.98) (-0.55) (-1.62) (1.99) (1.08) (2.03) 
Idirector 0.009 -0.056 -0.004 -0.106 0.013 -0.189 
 (0.92) (-0.75) (-0.10) (-1.17) (0.19) (-1.29) 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 8,601 8,600 7,631 
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.011 0.775 0.083 0.202 0.092 
Number of firms 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 1028 
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Table 9 Regression Results on Tunneling  
Transfer, funds transferred from the listed firm to its parent company and/or other firms in the same group; 
OtherAR, the balance of other receivables over total assets. We control fixed effects of firm, year and 
industry. T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Transfer OtherAR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Nopay -0.006*** -0.002 
 (-2.71) (-1.04) 
Age 0.011 0.003 
 (1.28) (0.38) 
Dual -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.87) (0.75) 
Size 0.005** -0.001 
 (2.11) (-0.37) 
Leverage -0.005 0.082*** 
 (-0.41) (8.74) 
Largest -0.032** -0.034*** 
 (-2.57) (-3.20) 
CEO share 0.081 -0.342 
 (0.26) (-1.12) 
Government -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.21) (-0.55) 
Idirector -0.006 0.000 
 (-0.54) (0.01) 
Observations 8,601 8,601 
R2 0.412 0.580 
Number of firms 1028 1028 
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Table 10 Impact of split-share reform in 2005 on promotion decision 
Promotion, a dummy variable, 1 if chairman leaves for a job in government in year t+1, higher position in 
the parent group, or executive position of a larger firm and otherwise zero. PoliticalP is a dummy variable, 
1 if chairman leaves for a job in government in year t+1 and otherwise zero. BusinessP is a dummy 
variable, 1 if chairman leaves for higher position in the parent group or executive position of a larger firm 
in year t+1 and otherwise zero. Reform, a dummy variable, equals to 1 if the stocks owned by the 
government are tradable and zero otherwise. We control fixed effects of year and industry. Z statistics 
based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 Promotion PoliticalP BusinessP 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Nopay 0.617*** 0.325*** 0.684*** 
 (9.53) (3.36) (9.12) 
Reform -0.100 -0.196 -0.015 
 (-0.63) (-0.82) (-0.08) 
No pay x Reform -0.247** -0.268* -0.225* 
 (-2.46) (-1.79) (-1.93) 
Age -0.701*** -1.083*** -0.406** 
 (-4.28) (-4.50) (-2.22) 
Gender -0.021 0.028 -0.044 
 (-0.16) (0.13) (-0.30) 
Dual -0.451*** -0.279** -0.550*** 
 (-4.16) (-2.05) (-3.80) 
ROA 0.039 -0.671 0.289 
 (0.08) (-0.99) (0.55) 
Sales growth -0.066 0.046 -0.125** 
 (-1.19) (0.59) (-2.04) 
Size 0.034 0.159*** -0.021 
 (1.24) (3.89) (-0.70) 
Leverage 0.171 -0.372* 0.354** 
 (1.26) (-1.91) (2.35) 
Largest 0.165 0.283 0.039 
 (1.03) (1.15) (0.22) 
CEOshare -2.286 -7.506 -1.546 
 (-0.38) (-0.53) (-0.24) 
Government 0.157*** 0.548*** -0.091 
 (2.92) (6.70) (-1.47) 
Constant 0.406 -1.136 0.048 
 (0.51) (-1.04) (0.05) 
Test: No pay + No pay x Reform = 0 
χ2 21.24*** 0.22 24.33*** 
Observations 8,601 8,601 8,601 
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.102 0.099 
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Table 11 Impact of Share Reform on Firm Performance  
This table is based upon a subsample of CEOs who experience the stock-split reform. Reform, a dummy variable, equals 1 if the stocks owned by 
the government are tradable and zero otherwise. We control fixed effects of firm, year and industry. T statistics based on robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 ROA RET Asset turnover Sales growth ΔAssets ΔEmployees Transfer OtherAR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Nopay 0.008*** 0.020 0.020 0.106** 0.029 0.041 0.002 0.007** 
 (2.79) (0.55) (1.10) (2.40) (1.16) (0.54) (0.63) (2.02) 
Reform 0.013*** 0.207*** 0.053** 0.120** 0.037 -0.087 0.004 -0.014*** 
 (2.68) (3.81) (2.15) (2.20) (1.12) (-0.80) (0.72) (-3.15) 
Nopay x Reform -0.006* -0.013 0.002 -0.087** -0.001 0.020 -0.015*** -0.008*** 
 (-1.91) (-0.33) (0.10) (-2.54) (-0.06) (0.44) (-3.70) (-2.59) 
Age 0.075 1.446 -0.264 -0.251 0.912 -0.306 -0.076 -0.310*** 
 (0.64) (1.42) (-0.52) (-0.22) (1.23) (-0.22) (-0.60) (-3.09) 
Dual 0.002 0.014 -0.005 -0.012 0.028 0.163*** -0.009** 0.002 
 (0.70) (0.36) (-0.31) (-0.37) (1.07) (2.70) (-2.38) (0.67) 
Size 0.011*** -0.064** -0.052*** 0.092** 0.202*** 0.112*** 0.006 0.000 
 (3.45) (-2.34) (-3.31) (2.53) (8.75) (3.00) (1.24) (0.03) 
Leverage -0.154*** 0.121 -0.061 0.078 -0.044 0.114 -0.034* 0.061*** 
 (-12.67) (1.17) (-1.13) (0.55) (-0.52) (0.89) (-1.81) (4.58) 
Largest 0.054*** -0.123 0.407*** 0.456** 0.204* 0.211 -0.009 -0.032** 
 (3.80) (-0.84) (5.09) (2.49) (1.82) (1.04) (-0.46) (-2.34) 
CEO share -1.066* -10.166 -10.511*** 9.282 17.173* 13.811* 0.727 -0.078 
 (-1.89) (-1.19) (-2.63) (1.52) (1.76) (1.69) (1.07) (-0.18) 
Government -0.031** -0.086 0.144** -0.013 -0.351 0.528 -0.011 0.000 
 (-2.42) (-0.50) (2.52) (-0.09) (-1.39) (1.43) (-0.34) (0.01) 
Idirector -0.001 -0.116 0.016 -0.156 -0.054 -0.317* 0.004 -0.007 
 (-0.06) (-0.81) (0.22) (-1.26) (-0.50) (-1.76) (0.32) (-0.58) 
Test: No pay + No pay x Reform = 0    
F-value 0.78 0.02 1.34 0.22 1.24 0.86 11.16*** 0.03 
Test: Reform + No pay x Reform = 0    
F-value 2.49 11.78*** 4.15** 0.30 1.03 0.42 2.94* 21.18*** 
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Observations 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 4,219 
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.012 0.832 0.122 0.217 0.065 0.498 0.573 
Number of firms 606 606 606 606 606 606 606 606 
 
  
57 
 
Table 12 Executive perquisites, firm performance and tunneling  
This table presents the results on firm performance and tunneling after controlling the impact of executive perks. Mperk is the abnormal level of 
administrative expenses estimated by equation (5). T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 ROA RET Asset turnover Sales growth ΔAssets ΔEmployees Transfer OtherAR 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Nopay 0.005** 0.011 0.027** 0.013 0.018 -0.014 -0.006** -0.001 
 (2.16) (0.56) (2.34) (0.54) (1.32) (-0.42) (-2.23) (-0.47) 
Mperk -0.126*** 0.365** 0.337*** 0.758*** 0.146 0.328 -0.000 -0.012 
 (-4.58) (2.14) (3.25) (3.58) (1.14) (1.08) (-0.01) (-0.40) 
Age 0.022** -0.036 0.011 -0.195** -0.064 -0.025 0.014 0.004 
 (2.42) (-0.55) (0.27) (-2.36) (-1.33) (-0.20) (1.35) (0.50) 
Dual 0.003 0.021 0.013 -0.011 0.028 0.104** -0.004 0.004 
 (1.05) (0.74) (0.84) (-0.39) (1.48) (2.19) (-0.93) (1.18) 
Size 0.012*** -0.021 -0.008 0.115*** 0.167*** 0.182*** 0.005* 0.001 
 (4.03) (-1.22) (-0.64) (5.03) (10.96) (5.82) (1.73) (0.44) 
Leverage -0.173*** -0.040 -0.141*** 0.021 -0.148*** -0.067 -0.017 0.062*** 
 (-17.12) (-0.66) (-4.04) (0.25) (-3.18) (-0.62) (-1.11) (4.85) 
Largest 0.059*** 0.012 0.075 0.243 0.229*** 0.313* -0.020 -0.022* 
 (4.90) (0.11) (1.20) (1.57) (2.78) (1.82) (-1.36) (-1.77) 
CEO share 1.083* -3.487 0.653 12.552*** 14.165*** -0.649 0.463 -0.486 
 (1.89) (-0.53) (0.19) (2.67) (2.99) (-0.12) (1.25) (-1.35) 
Government 0.003 -0.002 -0.018 0.027 0.022 0.064* 0.002 0.001 
 (1.07) (-0.07) (-1.21) (0.98) (1.43) (1.82) (0.52) (0.34) 
Idirector -0.001 -0.261** -0.091 -0.253** -0.093 -0.151 0.007 0.011 
 (-0.11) (-2.52) (-1.39) (-2.17) (-1.13) (-1.02) (0.43) (0.72) 
Observations 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 5,930 
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.012 0.795 0.092 0.241 0.117 0.438 0.552 
Number of firms 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 
 
 
